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In the Supreme Court
ollhe State ol Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 9117

THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
AND ALL THE JUDGES THEREOF,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On September 10, 1959, this court rendered a decision,
Case No. 9117, recalling an Alternative Writ it had previously issued against the Defendants and Respondents,
prohibiting inspection of the transcript of the testimony
of witnesses listed on an indictment by the Salt Lake
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County Grand Jury returned against Theodore I. Guerts
for "Misconduct In Office." In accordance with Rule
76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appellant herewith
petitions for a rehearing of said cause on the grounds hereinafter set forth.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW IN THAT THE HARRIES CASE
AND THE UTAH STATUTES INTERPRETED THEREBY INDICATE THAT A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED
TO VIEW THE GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS ONLY
AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL.
POINT II.
THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, UPON WHOSE
OPINION IN CLAGGETT V. JAMES THE MAJORITY
RELY, HAS, SINCE THE DATE OF THE MAJORITY'S
OPINION, CLARIFIED ITS POSITION AND THEREBY LENT SUPPORT TO THE VIEWS OF PETITIONER.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW IN THAT THE HARRIES CASE
AND THE UTAH STATUTES INTERPRETED
THEREBY INDICATE THAT A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO VIEW THE GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS
ONLY AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL.
Title 77, Chapter 19, Section 10, Utah Code Annotated,
plainly states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"No member of the grand jury, nor any person
at any time present at any session of the grand
jury, shall disclose what he himself or any other
grand juror or person may have said at such session. No grand juror shall divulge in what manner
he or any other grand juror may have voted on a
matter before them. Any grand juror or other person
may, however, be required by any court to disclose
the testimony of a witness examined before the grand
jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is
consistent with that given by the witness before
the court, or to disclose the testimony given before
the grand jury by any person upon a charge
against such person for perjury in giving his testimony, or upon his trial therefor."
This section plainly states the exceptions to the general
rule of secrecy and says the Grand Jury testimony may
be examined" * * * for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness before
the court." Prior to trial there can hardly be any testimony of a witness before the court. The statute therefore
precludes any disclosure to show inconsistency until
there has been testimony to be proven inconsistent.
This language was thus interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Harries, 221 P2d 605,
wherein the court said at page 614 after quoting the above
noted language:
"The quoted sections establish that the legislature only intended to lessen the tension of the
common law rules to the extent of making a transcript available to the defendant for impeachm~nt
purposes * * *. Furthermore the legislature could
have very easily prescribed that a copy of the
transcript be furnished the defendant had it inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tended to be the case. * * * If use of the transcript
is limited to impeachment purposes, then defendant could not make a claim of contradictorry stories
until a witness who had appeared before the Grand
Jury had testified in the trial of the cause. Until
that time there could be no showing made that
there were variances in the testimony of any witness on the two occasions."
The District Court exercised its discretion in the Harries
case and denied defendant's motion to view the Grand
Jury transcript prior to trial. The above noted passages
indicate the reasons the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's action.
It is true the Supreme Court was merely upholding
the use of the trial court's discretion and it could be argued
that this same court would uphold the discretion of a
trial court in allowing the defendant to view the Grand
Jury transcript before trial. However, the language used
in the Harries case, in support of the ruling of the trial
court, clearly establishes that in no instance could the
statutory provision for impeachment come into existence
until trial commences. It is equally clear, no disclosure
of Grand Jury testimony to a defendant other than for
impeachment upon the basis of inconsistent statements
is permitted by command of the legislature.

Hence the trial court may exercise its discretion only
after a former Grand Jury witness has testified at trial as
to whether that witness's Grand Jury testimony may be
revealed. In short, there is no option allowed the trial
court until trial has commenced.
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POINT II.
THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, UPON WHOSE
OPINION IN CLAGGETT V. JAMES THE MAJORITY
RELY, HAS, SINCE THE DATE OF THE MAJORITY'S
OPINION, CLARIFIED ITS POSITION AND THEREBY
LENT SUPPORT TO THE VIEWS OF PETITIONER.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in denying a petition
for rehearing in the case of Claggett v. James.
Mo.
S. A. 2d in a decision handed down on September 14, 1959,
went to some lengths to clarify and explain their position
as stated in the opinion cited by the majority. This clarification and explanation voiced after the majority here
handed down their decision, effectively and clearly supports the position of petitioner.
In the case of Claggett v. James the court did allow
defendant to see the record of the Grand Jury prior to
trial; however, it must be noted that defendant therein
alleged four separate instances wherein his access to the
transcript was necessary. In the instant case, defendant
has alleged only one, and that one is the very one the
Missouri Supreme Court specifically rejects, namely that
preparation for trial will thereby be easier. The court,
in its latest pronouncement, states in clarification of its
original opinon, that:
"In accordance with these cases we hold that
inspection of grand jury transcript should not be
permitted for purposes of discovery or as a substitute for taking depositions of witnesses endorsed
on the indictment, but only when and to the extent
that is shown to be necessary to meet the ends of
justice. * * * Our ruling did not mean that anyone
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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indicted is entitled to all of the testimony of all
the witnesses before the grand jury even if it is all
material and relevant, and it might well be an
abuse of discretion to permit it."
These pronoucements point up the fatal flaw in defendant's argument. Even conceding arguendo that in
Utah the law allows grand jury transcript to be viewed by
a defendant prior to trial, such can only be the case when
a proper showing of legitimate need has been made, and
not as a substitute for the established disclosure procedure.
The fact that defendant could thereby more conveniently
prepare his case can hardly justify deviation from the
long established rule of grand jury secrecy. Any information which defendant claims he must have through grand
jury testimony prior to trial or be irreparably damaged,
may just as easily be acquired through interrogation of
the witnesses involved who are in no way precluded
from relating what information they may have concerning
the particular crime alleged in the indictment. As the U.S.
Supreme Court said in U. S. v. Proctor & Gamble, 356

u.s. 669:
"* * *This indispensable secrecy of grand jury
proceedings must not be broken except where there
is a compelling necessity. There are instances when
that need will outweigh the countervailing policy
but that must be shown with particularity. No
such showing was made here. * * * If the grand
jury transcript were made available, discovery
through depositions which might involve delay and
substantital costs would be avoided, yet these
showings fall short of proof that without the
transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or
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that without reference to it an injustice would be
done. * * * We do ~~t reach in this case problems
concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at
the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility and the like. Those
are cases of particularized need where the secrecy
of the proceeding is lifted discretely and limitedly. We only hold that no compeling necessity has
been shown for the wholesale discovery and production of a grand jury transcript * * *. We hold
that a much more particularized, more discrete
showing of need is necessary to establish good
cause."
Defendant in this case has made the barest showing
of convenience and no more. Certainly defendant made
absolutely no showing of "good cause" as discussed in
the Proctor and Gamble case noted above.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully submits the decision of the
majority in the instant case is contrary to the established
law of the State of Utah as pronounced by the legislature
and interpreted by this honorable court. The blanket authority granted to defense counsel to go on "a fishing expedition" for purposes of discovery under the guise of
trial preparation is contrary to legislative intent as interpreted by the Harries Case. Allowing any party indicted
by a Grand Jury access to the heretofore secret transcripts
of said Grand Jury upon a bare showing that it would assist his trial preparation ignores established principles
of law. This does not invoke a court's discretion, but esSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tablishes procedure wherein through mere formality of
making a motion to the court he can obtain said transcripts. Is this not the case in each and every instance?
When then would a defendant be refused? It may also be
noted that the majority opinion suggests no guides or
standard for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion. There, too, it appears that the censoring of the transcript, or excising of certain portions, would involve
an exercise of discretion by the trial court which the defendant might be entitled to have reviewed on appeal
after conviction.
It is stated by Justice Eager in his dissent in the
Claggett Case, "The resultant question always is whether
the ends of justice will be furthered by the request of
disclosure. This involves not only the rights of the accused, but the rights and interest of the public in the administration of the criminal laws."

Petitioner in no way concedes that the defendant is
entitled to the transcripts prior to trial, but to the contrary,
as we interpret the legislative intent and ruling of the
Harries Case, defendant is only entitled to the transcript
after commencement of the trial for the purpose of ascertaining whether the trial witnesses' testimony is consistent with that given by him before the Grand Jury, and
then only upon good cause shown. Assuming arguendo
that defendant is entitled to view the transcripts prior to
trial, it is our position that good cause still must be shown
in order for the trial judge to allow inspection.
It should be remembered that the divulging of Grand
Jury testimony is an exception to the general rule and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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should be engaged in not when the court feels no harm
will be done thereby, but rather when they are convinced
great and irreparable harm will result from denial. The
action of the District Court in granting defendant's motion
on such a meager showing is clearly an abuse of discretion.
It is respectifully requested This Honorable Court

should in the interests of justice review its decision in this
instance.
Respectfully submitted,
JAY E. BANKS
District Attorney
3rd Judicial District

PETER F. LEARY
Deputy District Attorney
3rd Judicial District

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General

RICHARD R. BOYLE
Assistant Attorney General

ARTHUR A.

A~LEN,

JR.

Special Prosecutor
Attornll!Js for Appellant.
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